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Abstract  
 
Wind energy, like other forms of renewable energy, has the potential to 
contribute to a more sustainable energy future but it has remained a fringe energy 
source. The acceleration of wind energy development is difficult and depends on the 
choices of policy options, policy formulation and other policy-making processes. It is 
therefore of policy and scholarly interest to examine whether policy learning, a 
process by which policy stakeholders adjust a policy in response to past experiences 
and new information (Hall, 1993), may improve the efficacy of the policies for wind 
energy.  
 
In this paper, we assess the role of policy learning in improving the efficacy of 
energy policies by examining the evolution of the pricing policies for wind energy in 
China since 1994 when China’s first pricing policy for wind was introduced. A 
distinctive feature of the wind pricing policies in China was the prolonged debate 
regarding the relative merits of two competing policies – the tendering policy (a 
policy of price liberalization) and the fixed-price policy (a policy of price regulation). 
It is in this Chinese context that this paper contrasts the developments of three 
distinctive phases of pricing policies for wind energy between 1994 and 2009, and 
compares the local policy responses in three Chinese provinces, Guangdong, 
Shanghai and Xinjiang.  
 
This paper adopts a case-study approach. The analysis of this paper focuses on 
the policy changes at the national level, including the move away from the tendering 
policy to a fixed-price policy in 2009, and the diversity of local policy responses that 
ranged from the introduction of a local fixed-price policy in Guangdong to the local 
implementation of the tendering model in Shanghai and the introduction of a de 
facto fixed-price policy in Xinjiang.  
 
Our findings suggest that technical and conceptual forms of policy learning have 
taken place in China in relation to the policies for wind energy, but the progression 
towards a high-order of policy learning, social learning, was severely constrained 
under the established fabric of central-local relations. This paper shows that policy 
learning improved policy coherence. Another benefit of policy learning is a better 
understanding of the unintended policy outcomes and the underlying incentive 
structures among policy stakeholders. The progression of policy learning was 
achieved through a number of enablers, including knowledge creation, institutions 
for knowledge accumulation and information disclosure, and the emergence of an 
issue network. However, overcentralisation, the inertia against institutional changes 
and the failure to recognize the need for a more deliberative decision-making 
process, which all emerge from the current central-local tensions in China’s 
governance system, were identified as the key barriers to the policy learning process.  
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Introduction 
 
The current fossil fuel-dominated energy systems in both developed and developing 
countries have led to acute environmental challenges that range from serious air pollution to 
acid rain and human-induced climate change impacts. Renewable energy, such as wind energy 
and solar power, generally are inexhaustible and emit low emissions. However, although 
renewable energy is capable of making a significant contribution to the transition towards more 
sustainable energy systems, it has remained a fringe energy source (Jefferson, 2008). 
The barriers to the growth of renewable energies are many. A major constraint is that they 
are generally more expensive than conventional energy (Tester et al., 2005). They are often 
intermittent in nature creating additional challenges for energy system reliability. Furthermore, 
current energy markets are biased against renewables because of the “lock-in” effect of the 
established technologies. As the conventional energy technologies are already mature and have 
achieved economies of scale, it is often difficult to achieve a short-term transition to renewable 
energy sources (UNEP, 2006).  
In view of these barriers, public policies have been introduced by governments to support 
renewable energy. These policies for renewable energy are usually justified on a number of 
grounds, including the need to rectify externalities, to remove market barriers, to overcome 
institutional barriers, and to meet strategic needs such as enhancing energy security (OECD, 1997; 
Sawin and Flavin, 2004). While there is empirical evidence suggesting that renewable energy 
could not be extensively developed without some form of public policy support (Sawin and Flavin, 
2004), using public policies to accelerate development of renewable energies has been proven 
difficult, and policy outcomes are mixed. 
China is part of the global trend of formulating policies to accelerate the deployment of 
renewable energy. As extensively documented elsewhere (MIT, 2007; Wehrle, 2008; World Bank, 
2007; Zhao, 2006), China’s impressive economic achievements in the past three decades have 
come at a cost of serious environmental degradation. China’s coal-based energy system, which 
provides 80 percent of the electricity by burning coal (IEA, 2007c; Tian, 2008), has created not 
only pollution problems, but raised concerns about energy security and social instability. There 
have been growing commitments from China’s top leaders to use laws and policies to accelerate 
the development of renewable energy.  
         Wind energy is one of the prioritized renewable energy sources in China because it is 
relatively cost competitive with conventional energy sources (IEA 2007c), and it has potential for 
wide-scale application as already demonstrated in some countries such as Germany and 
Denmark (BMU, 2009; GWEC, 2009b, c; Teske et al., 2007). Benefiting from the enactment of the 
Renewable Energy Law in 2005 and the associated supportive policies that cover pricing, R&D, 
grid access and other policy domains, wind energy in China has experienced impressive growth. 
The installed capacity of wind energy in China doubled each year from 2004 to 2008, and 
reached 12.8 GW by the end of 2008 (CHECC, 2008; EF, 2009; Martinot and Li, 2007). There are 
152 commercial-scale wind farms in 20 Chinese provinces, equipped with approximately 6,500 
wind turbines (end 2007) (CHECC, 2008; IEA, 2007b; Li, 2008). China now ranks fourth in the 
world in terms of the number of wind installations (GWEC, 2009a). 
Although promising, the outlook for wind energy in China is clouded by various factors. 
Wind is still a fringe energy source contributing only 0.16 percent of the country’s total electricity 
generation and 0.78 percent of the total installed capacity (end 2007) (SERC, 2009).  
It is against this mixed picture for wind energy in China that the pricing policies for this 
renewable energy source have been one of the most critical policies in shaping the evolutions of 
wind energy in China. Since the first pricing policy for wind was introduced in China in 1994, 
there were some drastic and interesting developments in pricing policies at both the national 
and local levels. A distinctive characteristic of the pricing policies for wind in China was the 
prolonged debate between the choice of two policy options, the tendering policy (a policy of 
price liberalisation) and the fixed-price policy ( a policy of price regulation). As noted elsewhere 
(Li, et al., 2007; Mah & Hills, 2008), the adoption of the tendering policy by the central 
government in 2003 has succeeded in accelerating the scale of new wind installations in China, 
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but the policy was ended recently in July 2009 when the central government decided to replace 
it with a nation-wide fixed-price policy. Another interesting development in China in relation to 
the wind pricing policy is an emergency of a wide variety of local responses. At the provincial 
levels, the localities had introduced different pricing policies. Guangdong, for example, 
pioneered local fixed-price policies. Shanghai on the other hand used a two-tier pricing policy. 
Xinjiang, in contrast, used a de facto fixed-price policy.  
These interesting developments in pricing policies for wind energy at both the national and 
local levels in China have given rise to a number of important questions that need to be 
answered: what are the impacts of the national policies on the localities? How do the localities 
contribute to the policy-making process for pricing policies? In addition, perhaps more 
importantly, what are the responses of the Centre and provinces when there are conflicts 
between national priorities and local interests? What are the mechanisms that can resolve the 
conflicts for better policies? What are the conditions that work or do not work, how and why? By 
answering these questions, this paper aims to provide a better understanding of how the efficacy 
of renewable policies in China can be improved. 
Our initial research into the governance aspects of wind pricing policy in China, as reported 
in Mah and Hills (2008), was an attempt to shed light on central-local relations, power struggles 
and tensions in policy-making for wind energy. The initial research however did not provide 
many insights into what mechanisms can resolve the central-local relations, and may improve 
the efficacy of wind energy policies. To carry our work forward, we therefore conduct this case 
study of pricing policies for wind in China, and adopt the concept of policy learning to develop a 
conceptual framework of our analysis.  
Policy learning is a policy-making process that emphasises policy adjustment in response to 
past experiences and new information (Hall, 1993). Specifically, this paper will develop a 
framework to build connections between the concepts of policy learning and central-local 
relations, and applies these concepts to the examination of the evolution of pricing policies for 
wind energy in China.  
This paper has three main objectives. First, it will examine the evolution of the pricing 
policies for wind energy in China, at both the national level and in three Chinese provinces, 
Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang, from 1994 onwards. Second, it will assess the extent to which 
policy learning took place in China. Third, it will conceptualise the workings of policy learning in 
the central-local tensions in the Chinese context in relation to wind energy policies. Specifically, 
this paper seeks to identify and examine the key drivers, barriers and enablers of the policy 
learning process. 
This paper concern with the following research questions: has policy learning changed over 
time, and if so, has it improved or deteriorated? Who were the key policy agents of learning? 
How did these agents interact and learn? Why did the agents interact in the observed ways? 
This paper adopts a case-study approach and has two dimensions of analysis. A case-study 
approach is well suited to provide answers to “how” and “why” questions (Yin, 2003), and is 
therefore a useful research methodology to understand how and why policy learning works or 
does not work in Chinese provinces in the context of wind pricing policies. The first dimension of 
analysis is a longitudinal analysis focusing on the national-level policy changes. This contrasts the 
developments of three distinctive phases of pricing policies for wind energy between 1994 and 
2009. The second dimension analysis focuses on the local levels, and it compares the local policy 
responses in three Chinese provinces, Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang in relation to the 
pricing policies for wind energy.  
Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang are selected for this case study for a number of reasons. 
Guangdong in the southeast coast, Shanghai in the east coast, Xinjiang in the northwest inland 
provide a geographic representation of Chinese provinces. In addition, the provinces have 
remarkable differences in their economic, political and social conditions (Chung, 2003; World 
Bank, 2006; Tang, et al., 1997; Cheung 2002). A comparison of the three provinces thus offers a 
valuable opportunity for a better understanding of the contextual factors influencing the ways 
wind pricing policies evolved.   
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The analysis presented here draws on data and information derived from desktop research, 
site visits and interviews with prominent stakeholders. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
in Beijing, Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang between 2005 and 2009. Interviews were 
conducted with government officials, senior executives from energy utilities, wind farm 
developers, wind turbine manufacturers, academics, NGOs, industrial associations and 
consultants.  
As some interviewees agreed to be interviewed only anonymously, this study indicates 
interviews by number. The first two letters indicate the location (BJ for Beijing, XJ for Xinjiang, SH 
for Shanghai and GD for Guangdong), the two digits indicate the interview numbers, and that 
followed by the year of interviews. The list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1. 
In the rest of this paper, we first provide an overview of the environmental governance and 
policy-making systems in China in which wind energy policies are embedded. We then discuss 
the conceptual framework of policy learning and its relevance to the pricing policies for wind 
energy in China. This paper then presents the principal findings, with the focus on examining the 
dynamics of the policy learning process in China, and the central-local relations as barriers and 
opportunities for policy learning. The final section of the paper discusses the implications of the 
findings. 
   
Policy-making for wind energy in China: its governance-political characteristics and 
the incentive structures  
 
This section discusses the governance-political features in China that characterizes the 
policy regime for wind energy, and examines the influences on the incentive structures of the 
key political players in the policy-making system for wind energy. Wind energy started to have a 
more important role in China’s energy system in 1986 when the first wind farm was built in 
Shandong Province (Greenpeace, 2005). Since then wind energy has experienced substantial 
development in terms of scale while the environmental governance and political systems have 
been transformed along with China’s economic reforms. As documented elsewhere (Tao and 
Mah, 2007), the environmental governance system in China has been reshaped by two major 
forces: the market reforms and decentralization.  
The emerging environmental governance system is distinguished by the increasing role of 
the local governments, as well as economic and societal actors in governing for the environment 
and sustainable development in China (Wu & Wang, 2007; Tao and Mah, 2007). It is, however, 
important to note that, the emerging roles of these non-state actors are to a large extent 
constrained by the central government (Ho, 2001; Lu, 2005; Schwartz, 2004). 
In the power sector, the power market reforms have led to fundamental changes in term of 
the ownership, market structure and regulatory systems. Once solely owned by the then State 
Power Corporation, the power sector now consists of two monopolised state-owned grid 
companies, five major state-owned power generation companies (which are commonly known as 
the Big Five), and a number of private independent power producers (Mah and Hills, 2008). 
Another major development in China’s power sector is the establishment of the State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission (SERC) as a new regulatory agency of China’s power sector in 2003 
(Pearson, 2005). 
In addition to the governance characteristics, China’s political system also possesses a 
number of distinctive features that may influence energy policies including wind energy policies. 
One of the most important features is the tradition of using provinces as policy “laboratories” to 
test more innovative approaches to economic reforms and major policy changes (Nee and 
Matthews, 1996; Wright, 2000). Another distinctive feature is the “groping along” approach, or 
“groping for stone to cross the river” approach, which tend to favour incremental change rather 
than radical change (Nee and Matthews, 1996; Wright, 2000; Naughton, 1995).  
The literature also documents a wide range of problems in China’s policy-making system: 
the fragmentation of administration (or commonly referred as the “tiao-tiao-kuai-kuai (lines-and-
blocks) organization” in China), the principal-agent problems, the problem of regional and local 
protectionism (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; OECD, 2008; James, 2002; Wedeman, 2001, 
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2003). Specifically, the policy style of bargained incrementalism in combination with the lack of 
accountability and transparency have raised concerned that the established policy-making 
system may not be sufficiently responsive to meet the challenges confronting this transitional 
state (Wright, 2000; Yan, 2001; OCED, 2005). 
It is within these dynamic governance and political contexts that the policies for wind 
energy have developed some distinctive features. These include: 
(1) The central government has retained strong control over the power sector 
The Centre dominates the power sector, a strategic sector in the Chinese economy (Mah 
and Hills, 2008). Under China’s administrative and political systems which have been extensively, 
the National Development and Reform Commission (国家发展和改革委员会 Guojia Fazhan 
he Gaige Weiyuanhui, NDRC) is the agency overseeing the power sector, including the wind 
energy sector (Mah and Hills, 2008; Figure 1 in the appendix). The NDRC has retained a 
commanding role in wind energy policies, as well as the price-setting and project-approval 
powers of all wind farm projects. All new wind farms, in regardless of their scale, large or small, 
are required to seek pricing approval from the central government on their on-grid price, that is 
the selling price of electricity from a grid-connected wind farm to a grid company.  Furthermore, 
all wind farm projects with a scale of 50 MW or above have to obtained project approval from 
the NDRC (NDRC, 2006c). However, it is interesting to note that Centre has delegated power to 
provinces to approve small projects – those with an installed capacity below 50 MW.  
Furthermore, the central government exercises strong control over the wind energy sector 
through the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). SASAC has 
the power to appoint and remove top executives of SOEs. The central government has a 
powerful influence over the wind sector through SOEs because 80 percent of total installed 
capacity is from wind farms owned by SOEs (Interview BJ/03/2009).  
(2) The Chinese provinces have some policy autonomy, but there are constraints 
Policy-making for wind energy at the provincial level is strongly influenced by the national 
policy framework. While the policy autonomy of the Chinese provinces are delegated and 
constrained by the Centre, it is interesting to note that the provinces play some relatively minor, 
but subtle roles in the policy-making process for wind energy. One of these subtle roles is the 
“policy laboratory” function. Guangdong, for example, pioneered China’s first fixed-price policy 
in 2001 while Shanghai pioneered China’s first green electricity market in 2005 (SH ECSC, 2009; 
Mah and Hills, 2008). Furthermore, as provinces are the only local states which have power to 
make legislation, they have important role to play in rule-making, and implementing central 
legislation and policies at the local levels (Qi, Ma, Zhang, & Li, 2008). 
Although provinces can only approve small wind farms of below 50 MW, they were able to 
play a key role in China’s wind energy development. The aggregate size of these small projects 
has been substantial, contributing approximately 50 percent of the new wind installations in 
2007, and 60 percent in 2008 (Interview BJ/03/2009). This suggests that wind farm developers 
tended to favour small projects to avoid red tape from the central government. 
(3) The SOEs are the key players 
As noted above, up to 80 percent of wind turbines in operation in China are owned by the 
SOEs. The central government has showed its emphasis on nurturing Longyuan, a subsidiary of 
China Guodian – one of the Big Five, as the national champion of the wind power generation 
industry. By mid 2009, Longyuan has built more than 50 wind farms with a total installed capacity 
more than 3 GW – about one fourth of China’s total (Longyuan, 2009). 
(4) There is an emergency of societal actors in the policy-making process for wind energy  
Mah and Hills (2008) document that an issue network comprised of a middle-ranking 
reformist government official, Greenpeace China, Energy Foundation, Chinese Renewable Energy 
Industries Association and a number of renowned Chinese wind experts played important roles 
in the policy process.  
(5) The introduction of national policies for renewable energy and the impacts on incentive 
structures 
The introduction of a number of national policies for renewable energy has created new 
incentives to the key policy stakeholders, including the state-owned power companies, grid 
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companies and local governments, to new wind installations. The renewable energy mandate 
introduced in 2007 is a good example of those policies. The mandate requires major power 
generation operators, predominately the Big Five to produce a minimum of renewable energy 
mandate of 3 and 8 percent by 2010 and 2020 respectively (NDRC, 2007a). The political 
obligation imposed on the Big Five has been widely perceived as a key driver for them to build 
new wind farms. 
Another example is the renewable energy surcharge introduced in 2006. The renewable 
energy surcharge is in effect a national cost-sharing system for wind energy. A renewable energy 
surcharge has been imposed on all electricity consumers in China since 2006. The surcharge was 
first set at 0.001 yuan/ kWh, and recently revised to 0.004 yuan/ kWh in November 2009. Under 
this surcharge system, provinces rich in wind energy can collect money by selling wind energy to 
wind-impoverished provinces. Some provinces, in particular those with the potential to earn 
money by selling wind energy such as Xinjiang, are therefore given a strong economic incentive 
to increase local new wind installations. Xinjiang, for example, received 43 million yuan subsides 
from other provinces under this cost-sharing system (NDRC, 2008). 
 
Policy learning as a conceptual framework  
 
Although policy learning is a concept originating from studies of organizational learning in 
the context of public policy (Busenberg, 2001), it has come into focus in environmental studies as 
a mechanism to facilitate governance for the environment and sustainable development (Hills, 
2006). 
Policy learning is a process by which policy makers and policy stakeholders deliberately 
adjust the goals, rules and techniques of a given policy in response to past experiences and new 
information (Hall, 1993). The relatively intensive policy changes of the pricing policy for wind 
energy in China in recent decades appear to suggest that policy adjustment, learning-by-doing 
and other key theoretical insights of policy learning are highly relevant to our analysis.  
The analysis of policy learning in this paper is embedded in the broad context of 
environmental governance. As Hills (2006) contends, “one of the most striking features of 1990s 
was the emergence of governance as a key issue in debates about the design and 
implementation of a wide range of public policies” (p.496). Governance is about steering the 
economy and society to reach collective goals (Pierre & Peters, 2000). Governance is linked with 
the emergence of new environmental policy instruments (Jordan et al., 2003). Such instruments 
are not only seen as outcomes of new approaches to policy making but also as part of the 
governance process itself. (Hills, 2006, p. 496) (emphasis added by authors).  
As such, our analysis frames policy-making for wind energy as a problem of governing rather 
than an economic, political or technological problem. Governance is a purposive guiding process 
in which a social system coordinates, steers and manages itself (Paquet, 1999). A core concept of 
governance is moving away from government to governance as governments can no longer rely 
on themselves to solve contemporary social problems. The literature on environmental 
governance sees a need for state, society and market to work together. This paper sees the 
development of wind energy as a complex process in which state, societal and market players, 
who are interdependent but who often have competing interests and differential power, interact 
and influence the evolution of wind energy policies.  
Central to the concept of policy learning is the differentiation of three types of learning, 
technical, conceptual and social learning. They evolve progressively from one another. Technical 
learning is a weak form of policy learning that consists of a search for new policy instruments 
with no adjustment of policy objectives (Gouldson, et al., 2008). Technical learning generally is 
technocratic and it occurs without fundamental discussion of policy objectives or basic strategies 
(Bennett and Howlett, 1992; Fiorino, 2001; Gouldson et al., 2008; Hall, 1993). Technical learning 
therefore often leads to harmonising regulation and the formulation of more supplementary 
rules (Fiorino, 2001; Glasbergen, 1996). 
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Conceptual learning moves forward from technical learning and it is an intermediate form of 
policy learning. It is a process in which policy goals are redefined, problem definitions are 
debated, and problem-solving strategies are adjusted. This intermediate-level of policy learning 
is therefore “more radical and far-reaching” than technical learning (Glasbergen, 1996, p. 182).  
Social learning, as the strongest form of policy learning, is the mode of policy learning that 
has increasingly, and significantly, come into scholarly focus  (Glasbergen, 1996). In contrast to 
technical and conceptual learning, social learning emphasizes the social context and social forces 
in shaping the policy process. Social learning emphasizes the interplay between societal actors 
that improve policies (Glasbergen, 1996). Social learning therefore requires more open and 
responsive communication (Glasbergen, 1996) and emphasizes cooperative relations among and 
between actors (Fiorino, 2001).  
The differentiation of the three progressive forms of policy learning has given rise to an 
important question: what are the benefits of progressing towards social learning in relation to 
sustainable development? The literature on policy learning suggests policy learning can improve 
policies. With its emphasis on reflexive, participatory, dialogic and adaptive approach in policy-
making, policy learning can be a useful mechanism to realign interests and resolve conflicts and 
hence improve efficacy of environmental policies (Gouldson, et al., 2008).  
What, then, are the conditions that make policy learning work, or fail to work?  A number of 
drivers, enablers and barriers of policy learning have been identified in the literature. As noted 
by Voß and Kemp (2006), a key driver of policy learning is reflexivity. Reflexivity has a core role 
particularly in social learning – the strongest form of policy learning, because social learning 
assumes there is no complete knowledge or complete control in the course of societal changes 
(Voß and Kemp, 2006). 
Dialogue is another enabler of policy learning. The literature on policy learning suggests that 
there are many ways to enhance the effectiveness of dialogue. The building up of long-term 
relations, the creation of a communication environment that encourages respect and equity in 
expressing dissent views are examples of ways to improve dialogue (Blackmore and Ison, 2007). 
Dialogue, however, can be obstructed by the presence of a policy monopoly, reiteration or re-
establishment of preconceived ideas, and the lack of time to build trusting relationships 
(Blackmore and Ison, 2007). 
The literature on policy learning also sheds important light on who matters. Some studies 
suggest that state actors are the key agent of learning (Etheredge and Short, 1983) while other 
studies suggest that societal actors and issue networks have important roles to play (Heclo, 1978; 
Sabatier, 1988). Although the literature may have diverse views on whether the state or societal 
actors are the key agent of learning, it is the role of societal actors who can span the state-
society divide that have increasingly come into scholarly focus. The literature suggests that 
political actors such as NGOs and international networks who have access to information, ideas, 
and positions outside the formal state apparatus have an important role in the progression 
towards stronger forms of policy learning (Heclo, 1978; Bennett and Howlett, 1992). The 
literature has also identified a special type of “spanning” actor who can cross the state-society 
divide in policy-making (Mah and Hills, 2008; Bennett and Howlett, 1992). “Policy middlemen” 
can make a difference because they are sensitive to windows of change, and can have access to 
external players and ideas as well as formal powerful institutions (Bennett and Howlett, 1992; 
Heclo, 1974).  
Although the theoretical insights of the concept of policy learning is likely to be useful in 
guiding our analysis, policy learning however is a complex process and many of the workings are 
yet to be understood in the literature. The literature is particularly limited in relation to 
renewable energy policies and in developing countries such as China. In addition, most of the 
existing literature on policy learning in China has a rather narrow focus on knowledge and 
technology transfer (see for example Bennett et al., 2001; Buckley et al., 2004; Hu et al., 2005). 
More robust studies that integrate the theoretical perspectives of policy learning and empirical 
analysis in the context of China have been scant, with a few exceptions such as the work by 
Gouldson et al. (2008). To partly fill these gaps, this paper applies the theoretical insights of 
policy learning to an analysis of the evolution of the pricing policies in China.  
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Pricing policies for wind energy in China: the three distinct phases, and the 
diversity of local responses   
 
As Figure 1 indicates, there were three distinctive phases of the national-level policy 
changes for the pricing policies for wind energy in China from 1994 onwards. In the 
corresponding time period, there was a diversity of the local responses in the three selected 
provinces, Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang. We will now provide an account of the evolutions 
of the pricing policies differ in the three phases, and between the central and provincial level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The national-level choices and local diversity in response to the three phases of the 
pricing policies for wind energy in China 
 
 
 
The three distinct phases at the national level 
 
Since the introduction of the first pricing policy for wind energy in 1994, policies in this area 
have experienced a number of important developments. Three distinctive phases of the pricing 
policies can be identified. Phase 1 started in 1994 when China introduced its first pricing policy 
for wind energy, the “repay plus profit” pricing formula. Phase 2, from 2003 to July 2009, was a 
period of policy divergence in which the central government shifted over its choices over the two 
competing pricing options: the tendering and fixed-price policies. This phase also showed a 
difference between the central government’s choice and local preferences in the choice of 
pricing options. Phase 3, starting from July 2009 onwards, is a phase of policy convergence 
between the Centre and provinces as a nation-wide fixed-price policy has been introduced. 
These three distinctive phases of the pricing policies are illustrated in Figure 1, and are 
elaborated in greater detail as follows: 
 
Phase 1 (from 1994 to 2003): “Repay plus profit” pricing formula 
 
Although China built its first wind farm as early as 1986 (Greenpeace 2005a), it was only 
until 1994 that China first introduced a pricing policy explicitly to promote wind energy. In 1994, 
the then Ministry of Electric Power (MOEP) issued an administrative regulation that introduced a 
“repay plus profit” pricing formula for wind energy: the on-grid price for wind energy was set at a 
level that would repay capital costs with interest plus a reasonable profit (Lema and Ruby, 2007; 
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Mah and Hills, 2008). This first pricing policy was introduced in a context when wind energy in 
China was small in scale (with less than 15 MW in 1994 (Lema and Ruby, 2007). This repay plus 
profit pricing policy was able to create some incentives for steady but slow growth in new wind 
installations during the period of Phase 1 (Mah and Hills, 2008).  
 
Phase 2 (from 2003 to July 2009): Policy divergence over tendering and fixed-price policies 
between the national choice and local preferences  
  
Phase 2 is distinguished by the differences in the policy choices between the central 
agencies, and also between the central and provincial governments, indicating that policy 
choices may differ horizontally across government agencies and also vertically between the 
central and local governments. 
The most important development in Phase 2 was the introduction of the tendering policy 
for wind energy, first as pilots in 2003, and later as a nation-wide policy in 2006 – when the NDRC 
issued a new regulation that stated that all wind farm projects, in regardless of their scale of 
installed capacity, should be tendered. However,  the tendering policy ended in July 2009 and 
was replaced by the fixed-price policy, as our paper will discuss  later. 
Another feature of Phase 2 is the occurrence of a dual-track pricing system – while the 
national tendering projects are organized, some provinces used the traditional price-approval 
approach to scrutinize on-grid price applications from local, small-scale wind farms. However, 
the central influence was still evident in those local projects because the tendered prices of 
national tendering projects have served as a key reference for those local projects (Li, et al., 
2007).  
On the other hand, the policy choices also differ between the central and provincial 
governments. During Phase 2, while the central government has shifted over its choice over the 
two competing pricing options, some provinces have showed their own preferences in the choice 
of pricing options. Guangdong pioneered China’s first fixed-price policy in 2001 while Shanghai 
adopted its own two-tier pricing policy for wind. Xinjiang used a de factor fixed-price policy. We 
will discuss these local policies in greater detail later in this paper. 
Another distinctive characteristic of Phase 2 is the emergence of a number of unintended 
policy outcomes following the introduction of the tendering policies. One example is that the 
SOEs have turned into aggressive bidders (Mah and Hills, 2009; Climate Group, 2009; Li et al., 
2006). As we noted above, the aggressive behaviour of the Big Five, which has been largely 
driven by the renewable energy mandate imposed on them, has depleted the economic viability 
of some wind farms (Interview BJ/01/2009) 
In addition, there is a much less documented, but also important, unintended outcome. It 
has been widely acknowledged among Chinese wind experts that there has been a spate of 
“pseudo-tendered” wind projects (「假招標」) in Chinese provinces since 2006 (Interview 
BJ/02/2009). These were tendered by the provincial governments rather than the central 
government. Although there is no government statistics available about the scale of these 
“pseudo-tendered” wind projects, a number of sources from the NDRC and Chinese wind experts 
noted that has been a widespread phenomenon, commonly found in a number of provinces, 
including Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Jilin and Hebei.  
These alleged pseudo-tendered projects differ from those tendered projects coordinated by 
the central government in two important ways. These wind farms are small in scale – with a 
majority of them at a scale just below 50 MW in order to stay within the provincial 50-MW 
project-approval authority. Another distinctive feature of these “pseudo” projects is that their 
on-grid prices are “pseudo” in a sense that the prices are allegedly set through under-the-table 
negotiation among local governments and developers. These projects therefore have a relatively 
high tendered price while the tendered price for centrally-led tendered wind farms tended to 
have prices driven down by the SOEs. In Hebei, for example, the local tendered price was 0.61 
yuan/ kWh, but the tendered price of a national tendered project also in Hebei was only 0.54 
yuan/ kWh (Interview BJ/03/2009). 
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Why, then, did these pseudo-tendered projects emerge in recent years?  And how do they 
influence the development of wind energy in China? It has been widely perceived by wind energy 
experts in China that this phenomenon has revealed that that a number of poor-coordinated 
wind energy policies have realigned the interests of the local wind farm developers, local 
governments and grid companies against the national objectives.  
For the SOEs, the MMS policy has driven them to invest in wind as much as possible in the 
shortest time, so they look for projects that can bypass the red-tape of the central government. 
For the local governments, under the new national cost-sharing system for renewable energy, 
they have every reason to fight for a higher on-grid price for the local wind farms. It is because 
high on-grid price will be shared by all electricity consumers across China (by way of a surcharge) 
while the economic benefits of the wind farm, in terms of local GDP, will be shared only within 
the province. However, the interests of the central government and the electricity consumers are 
less protected in this case. Consumers now pay more for wind, and the small local tendered 
projects tend to under-utilise the wind resource as prime wind sites are cut into small wind farms. 
This may damage prime wind sites as wind farm planning coordination and wind-siting may not 
be optimized (Interview BJ/02/2009).  
 
Phase 3: Policy convergence towards a fixed-price policy (from July 2009 onwards) 
 
Phase 3 is distinguished by the introduction of a nation-wide fixed-price policy in July 2009 
to replace the tendering policy. This new policy appeared to end the debate over the choice 
between the tendering and fixed-price policies. Four categories of fixed benchmark prices, 
ranging from 0.51to 0.61 yuan/ kWh, are set in association with four regions in China. The 
categories are determined by consideration of a number of factors including the richness of wind 
resources and administrative feasibility. A major objective of this new pricing policy is to ensure 
profit incentives and thus economic viability of investment in wind farms. While it is too early to 
observe the effectiveness of this new feed-in tariff policy, industrial experts, key government 
officials and a number of other key stakeholders suggest that there has been a widespread 
support for this policy (Interviews BJ/01/2009; BJ/02/2009; BJ/03/2009).  
 
Local responses in Guangdong, Shanghai and Xinjiang 
 
While the development of the three phases of the pricing policies is instructive in providing 
a longitudinal analysis of the policy evaluation, there is another interesting dimension of analysis, 
that is comparing how the local responses differed in parallel to the national policy changes. In 
the sections that follow, we will provide an overview of the diversity of the local responses in 
three selected Chinese provinces, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Xinjiang. 
 
Guangdong: a pioneer of the fixed-price policy ahead of the action of the Centre 
 
As we noted briefly above, Guangdong, in the southeast China, is well known in China for its 
pioneering of the fixed-price policy for wind energy. In 2001 Guangdong introduced its fixed-
price policy, the first of its kind in the country, by pegging the on-grid price of wind energy to the 
average electricity selling price of the grid company (Guangdong DPC et al., 2001). In 2004, 
Guangdong introduced its second fixed-price policy by setting the on-grid price for wind energy 
at 0.528 yuan/ kWh (Garrah Hassan, 2005). Guangdong introduced its third fixed price policy for 
wind energy three years later in December 2007 by revising the fixed price further upward to 
0.689 yuan/ kWh (GD PCA, 2007). 
Guangdong’s second fixed-price policy in 2004 was widely perceived among Chinese wind 
energy experts as a bold policy initiative because the central government had already indicated 
its interest in tendering policy through the introduction of the tendering pilot projects in 2003. It 
caused more attention in the industry in 2007 when Guangdong introduced its third fixed-price 
policy as the central government had made their preference over the tendering policy explicit by 
introducing a nation-wide tendering policy already in 2006. Rather than following the central 
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policy, Guangdong has not only chosen to retain its local fixed-price policy, but revised its third 
fixed-price upward to 0.689 yuan/ kWh to create strong profit incentives for wind investment.  
As reported elsewhere (Mah and Hills, 2008), by its fixed-price policies, Guangdong was able 
to create some profit incentives which stimulated investment in wind farms by its fixed-price 
policies. One notable impact of the conducive effects of market incentives is the relatively rapid 
increase in new installed capacity of wind farms within twelve months of the implementation of 
the province’s third fixed-price policy. A large number of smaller wind farms were built, but their 
aggregate scale has grown at a pace much faster than those driven by the central government’s 
tendering policy. 
 
Shanghai: a national policy followed; locally-grown two-tier policy abandoned 
 
While Guangdong has pioneered the fixed-price policy, Shanghai introduced its own local 
pricing policy, but not a fixed-price policy. Rather, Shanghai introduced a “two-tier” pricing policy 
for wind energy. This two-tier pricing policy was a locally grown policy which originated in 1990s 
when Shanghai used this policy to encourage investment in an oil-fired power plant which was 
originally designed as gas-fired power plants. Shanghai adopted this policy for wind energy in 
2003 when it built its first wind farm in Fengxian (奉贤).3 This locally grown policy however was 
abandoned in 2006 when Shanghai decided to follow the central policy of tendering. Shanghai 
issued a local regulation in 2006 which states that all local wind farms have to be tendered 
(Shanghai DRC, 2006).  
The locally grown two-tier pricing policy for wind energy guaranteed the wind farms a basic 
grid price (which is linked with the installed capacity) plus an “adjustable” price that varies 
depending on the actual amount of electricity generation (Interviews SH/1/2008; SH/2/2008). 
While it is difficult to draw direct linkages between the changes in the pricing policy and the scale 
of new wind installations (i.e. whether the two-tier policy or the local tendering policy speeded 
up or slowed down the investment in wind in Shanghai), the two-tier policy was widely perceived 
among local wind farm developers and governments as a useful policy to create some profit 
incentives for wind farms (Interviews SH/1/2008; SH/2/2008). 
 
Xinjiang: a de facto fixed-price policy 
 
Like Guangdong, Xinjiang was not interested in using the tendering policy at the local levels. 
But unlike Guangdong and Shanghai, Xinjiang did not show its capacity in policy innovation. 
Xinjiang also did not explicitly confront the central policy as Guangdong has done. Rather, 
Xinjiang used the conventional “project-approval” path - several of its new farm proposals were 
submitted to the NDRC’s Department of Price for on-grid price approval. In 2007, four wind 
projects in Xinjiang were granted the same price, at 0.51 yuan/ kWh, by NDRC’s Department of 
Price. It is evident that this is a fixed-price policy because the four wind farms in Xinjiang, 
although located in two different wind districts and owned by three wind farm developers, thus 
suggesting that there could be some cost differences, were granted a flat price (NDRC, 2007; 
Interview XJ/01/2008).  
Xinjiang was not alone in using this de facto fixed-price policy. As a matter of fact, NDRC’s 
Department of Price approved a total of 72 wind farms (including the four in Xinjiang) in eight 
provinces in 2007 with each province granted its own de facto fixed price (NDRC, 2007). The 
absolute number and the geographical coverage of these wind farms indicate this pricing 
practice has been applied relatively extensively and commonly across China, rather than on an 
individual basis. This pricing arrangement is regarded as de facto - although the central 
government had not yet introduced a fixed-price policy at that time, NDRC’s Department of Price 
did implicitly implement this competing policy choice through its administrative approval 
procedures.  
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.zskjj.gov.cn/show.asp?newsid=3763 
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Discussion  
 
A case study of the pricing policies for wind energy in China suggests that some progression 
of policy learning has taken place at both national and local levels. The findings suggest that 
while the policy learning process brought some benefits to policy-making, major limitations 
obstructing the progression towards the highest-order of learning – social learning – were also 
present. Benefits of policy learning were made possible by the creation of new knowledge, 
integration of policies and realignment of interests of different stakeholders. On the other hand, 
overcentralisation, the inertia against institutional change and the failure to recognize the need 
for a more deliberative decision-making process, which all emerge from the current central-local 
tensions in China’s governance system, were identified as the key barriers to policy learning 
process. We will now discuss these major findings in greater detail. 
 
(1) Policy learning for wind pricing policy in China: its progression from technical to 
conceptual learning, and its limitations in advancing further to social learning 
 
The longitudinal analysis across the three phases of the pricing policies at the national level, 
and the examination of the policy development across the three Chinese provinces, Guangdong, 
Shanghai and Xinjiang, both suggest that some degree of policy learning took place in our cases. 
On the basis of Glasbergen’s (1996) distinction between technical, conceptual and social forms of 
learning, we found that while technical and conceptual forms of policy learning are clearly 
evident in our cases, there were only some early signs of social learning.  
The introduction of the “repay plus profit” pricing policy in Phase 1 is a good example of 
technical learning because this policy played a key role in harmonising the pricing policies across 
different types of energy projects, but showed no evidence of conceptual or social learning. 
There was also no serious reflection on problem definitions and policy goals.  
The changes in pricing policies in Phase 2 on the other hand provide evidence of conceptual 
learning. The worsening environmental conditions in China coupled with China’s ‘fourth 
generation’ leadership headed by President Hu Jintao coming to power has created a new policy 
window for the central government to reflect about the need for more radical policy options 
which could drive down costs of wind and accelerate new wind installations. It was at this time 
that the policy options were widened in a sense that the competing alternatives of the pricing 
policies for wind energy, including tendering and fixed-price policies were put on the policy 
agenda and debated by the central government. There were some early signs of social learning, 
as an issue network, led by Greenpeace, was involved (Mah and Hills, 2008). However,  these 
signs were weak. The issue network was able to make some contribution in the early stages of 
policy-making, their involvement was not institutionalized, and hence was ad-hoc in manner. The 
issue network played consultative and advisory roles, but it had no power to make decision. The 
issue network shared no power with the NDRC who made the final decisions on policy choices.    
The abandonment of the tendering policy and the adoption of the fixed-price policy in 
Phase 3 has showed some stronger, although still limited, evidence of social learning. The 
decision to abandon the tendering policy in July 2009 was to a large extent “forced” by a bottom-
up dynamic of change that emerged from a spate of pseudo-tendered projects in some provinces 
– an unintended policy outcome of the national tendering policy. As we noted above, these small 
pseudo-tendered projects have become rampant and uncontrolled particularly in some provinces 
like Hebei and Inner Mongolia where wind resources are rich (Interview BJ/03/2009). The central 
government decided to abandon the tendering policy in part because it lacked effective 
measures to eradicate these pseudo-tendered projects. In other words, it was to a large extent 
the uncontrolled growth of the pseudo-tendered projects that forced the central government to 
adjust its policy strategies (Interviews BJ/01/2009; BJ/02, 2009). 
At the provincial level, it is interesting to note that policy learning took place in a similar 
trend as that at the national level. There was a progression from technical to conceptual learning 
with some early signs of social learning, and there are also barriers to the progression towards 
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the highest form of learning. However, there are some subtle differences of the ways policy 
learning took place in the provinces.  
It is interesting to note that the three provinces have made different progress in the policy 
learning process. Guangdong appeared to have progressed farthest among the three selected 
provinces that we studied. It is evident that Guangdong was able to progress from conceptual to 
social learning. Guangdong’s persistence in it own local fixed-price policy showed the province’s 
ability to formulate and implement more radical policy strategies. The policy-making process in 
Guangdong also appeared to be more permeable to local wind energy experts and other non-
state actors. In particular, the presence of Greenpeace and the associated issue network is an 
early sign of social learning, indicating the policy-making process in this province is more 
permeable to social forces. Shanghai, in contrast, has showed its ability in policy innovation 
adopting its local two-tier pricing policy for wind energy. However, its abandonment of its locally-
grown two-tier pricing policy in 2006 to give way to the tendering policy showed Shanghai had 
limited ability in debating competing policy options. As such, our assessment concludes that 
Shanghai has advanced to conceptual learning, but not yet to social learning. Xinjiang, as we 
noted above, has showed evidence of technical learning while conceptual or social learning has 
been minimal. Table 1 below illustrates the progression of policy learning in the three phases of 
the pricing policies from a longitudinal perspective, and in the three selected provinces at the 
local levels.  
Our findings suggest that while the progression from technical to conceptual learning has 
taken place in the cases, advancing further to social learning was severely constrained. What 
then, are the dynamics of change in the policy learning process? What benefits did policy 
learning bring to policy-making for wind energy in China? What are the enablers and barriers of 
the process? We will now discuss our observations in relation to these issues.  
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  Technical learning Conceptual 
Learning 
Social Learning 
National  
Level 
Phase 1 
 
● 
 
○ ○ 
Phase 2 ● 
 
 
● 
 
◔ 
 
Phase 3 ● ● ◐ 
 
Provincial 
Level 
Guangdong ● ● 
 
◔ 
 
Shanghai ● 
 
● 
 
○ 
Xinjiang ● 
 
○ ○ 
 
Table 1: The pricing policy for wind energy in China:  
The progression from technical to social learning 
 
 
●: Strong evidence 
◐: Mild evidence 
◔: Weak evidence 
○: Indiscernible evidence 
 
 
(2) The major dynamics of learning and the benefits 
 
There are three major dynamics of change that can be identified. The first dynamic of 
change is that new knowledge can offer policy legitimacy for a radical policy change. Although 
wind energy data is essential to many important aspects of the development process of wind 
energy in China, such data have been lacking (Mah and Hills, forthcoming), and this was even 
more so back in 2003 when the central government chose to implement tendering pilot projects 
rather than fixed-price policies for wind energy. The lack of wind data deterred the central 
government from choosing the fixed-price policy in 2003 in part of administrative reasons. The 
lack of basic wind data made it difficult for the central government to fix a price that could 
balance economic viability while avoiding “windfall profit”. Politically, a fixed-price policy was 
also not an attractive option to the central government because a fixed-price policy tends to 
increase tariff levels, and thus is politically sensitive. In contrast, tendering tends to drive tariff 
levels down. 
The political preference started to favour a fixed-price policy only in recent years when the 
central government introduced a national renewable energy surcharge in 2006. How, then, did 
the surcharge system alter the policy choices of the central government? The key contribution of 
the surcharge system is that it has given rise to a new institution for data collection and 
information disclosure which in turn facilitate policy-making for wind energy. As we noted above, 
this surcharge in effect is a national cost-sharing system. Provinces rich in wind energy can sell 
wind energy to other provinces under the coordination of the NDRC. The surcharge system 
therefore is a new institution that not only mandates the submission of data, but more 
importantly, is also one that creates economic incentives for wind farm developers and grid 
companies to submit wind energy data. Through this institution, key wind data now can be 
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collected by the central government include the actual installed capacity and actual wind energy 
yield. The reliability of the data is also enhanced through cross-checking from two data sources, 
one from the wind farm operators and the other from the grid companies (Interview BJ/01/2009). 
In essence, the new knowledge is crucial for the central government to justify a more radical 
policy choice in the midst of high public skepticism about tariff increases in China. As Shi Pengfei, 
a wind energy expert in China, noted, the availability of a relatively comprehensive wind dataset 
has created “a prerequisite that allows the fixed-price policy to be introduced in China” 
(Interview BJ/01/2009). This observation on institutional change suggests that new institutions 
for knowledge creation and accumulation and information disclosure are a key change required 
to break the inertia that may obstruct the policy learning process. 
The second dynamic of change is that a force of change from below was able to achieved 
political significance by ways of the aggregation of individual decisions (Beck, 1996; Holzer and 
Sørensen, 2003; Forester, 2008). The Chinese provinces, which hosted a growing number of 
“pseudo-tendered” wind farms, were able to create a broad coalition of proactive policy changes. 
This observation appears to indicate that a critical condition that seemed to facilitate policy 
learning is the local, horizontal link-up in localities to accelerate the needed policy changes at the 
national level.  
The third dynamic of change is learning from policy “failures” to better realign the interests 
of the policy stakeholders. It is evident in this case study that policy making for wind energy is a 
complex process, and is one that involves a great deal of uncertainty in policy outcomes while 
knowledge, in this case the availability of wind resource data, is limited. Unintended outcomes 
from pricing policies in the past include the aggressive bidding behaviour of some SOEs in the 
national tendered wind projects, and the emergence of a spate of local pseudo-tendered 
projects tendered by provincial governments. It is evident that learning from the unintended 
policy outcomes, and more importantly, the underlying incentive structures of the policy 
stakeholders was a key part of the policy learning process. As a senior government official from 
the NDRC noted, “we cannot change people’s behaviour directly, but we can provide new 
incentives to encourage behavioural change” (Interview BJ/03/2009). Policy learning appears to 
be an iterative process in which understanding the unintended policy outcomes are required 
continuously to improve policy design.  
The fourth dynamic of change is that the emergence of an issue network. The issue network 
led by Greenpeace was able to keep a radical pricing option alive, even though after the NDRC 
had chosen the tendering policy. Another important contribution of the issue network is that 
Greenpeace was able to gain credibility for the fixed-price policy through networking with mid-
rank government officials in the NDRC, and the mainland and international experts on wind 
energy (Interviews BJ/02/2009; BJ/04/2009). 
 
(3) The central-local tensions as the barriers of policy learning 
 
Although this paper has shown that there is considerable potential for policy learning, we 
also suggest that three types of tensions emerged in the established fabric of the central-local 
relations which appeared to constrain policy learning. The three types of tensions are tensions 
between centralization and decentralization, tensions between the organisational traditions and 
the institutional changes need for policy learning, and tensions between the Chinese policy style 
of “groping for stone to cross the river” and the need for a deliberative decision-making system. 
The first type of tension is the tensions between centralization and decentralization. Our 
cases suggest that there was a strong tendency of centralization, and in some cases over-
centralisation, which tended to standardize provincial policies. The uniformity of local policies 
was counter-productive to a large extent. A good example to illustrate the potential problem of 
centralization on wind energy policies is that local initiatives of policy innovation in Shanghai and 
Guangdong were dampened. Shanghai abandoned its local two-tier pricing policy. Guangdong 
deliberately modulated the price level when it introduced its second fixed-price policy in order to 
avoid central intervention. In both the cases, it is evident that the strong influence from the 
central government constrained policy innovation in localities. It is also of policy concern that 
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local needs, local contexts and local opportunities were not seriously taken into account by the 
central government when they made the choices about the pricing policies for wind energy. 
The second type of tension is the tensions between the organisational traditions and the 
institutional changes required for policy learning. The well documented sectoral fragmentation, 
or “tiao-tiao-kuai-kuai” problem of the Chinese government agencies was also present (see for 
example Lema and Ruby, 2007; Wu and Wang, 2007), and obstructed policy learning for the wind 
energy policies. China’s fragmented energy bureaucracy involves three key agencies at the 
central level, the newly-established National Energy Administration (NEA), the NDRC’s 
Department of Price and the SERC. NEA, which replaced the NDRC’s Energy Bureau, while still 
under the management of the NDRC, has been elevated to status of a half-level ministry (副部
級), is responsible for the planning and policy formulation of renewable energy. But a major 
constraint on NEA’s ability is that the price-setting power of energy, including wind energy, 
remain the purview of NDRC’s Department of Price (Interview BJ/02/2009).  
China’s fragmented energy bureaucracy has impeded environmental governance in relation 
to wind energy policies. In particular, the conflicting interests between NDRC’s Department of 
Price and the NEA has resulted differences in policy preferences over the tendering and fixed-
price policies. The Department of Price is responsible for approving price applications and 
therefore tends to favour a fixed-price policy as this is a Department of Price-led approach for 
approving wind projects. In contrast, the NEA is responsible for coordinating the tendering 
projects and therefore tends to favour tendering policies as tendering is an NEA-led approach. 
The problem of departmental fragmentation has obstructed policy coherence and policy learning 
as the pricing policies evolved over the past years (Li, et al., 2007).  
The third type of tension is the tensions between the Chinese policy style of  
groping for stones to cross the river” and the need for a  deliberative decision-making system. The 
Centre’s decision to choose the tendering policy in 2003 is another example of Chinese policy 
style of “groping for stone to cross the river (摸着石头过河)”. Central to this policy style is the 
learning-by-doing approach in circumstances of uncertainty in policy-making. Wind energy data, 
which is essential for using the fixed-price policy was seriously lacking in China in 2003. The use 
of the tendering policy since 2003 in China may be regarded as a pragmatic approach. However, 
some Chinese industrial experts and wind farm developers have pointed out that this 
experimental approach was not without cost. A major negative impact resulted is that while 
learning was active in ex post phase of policy-making, not much learning was able to take place in 
the ex ante phases. As such, the policy adjustment process was time-consuming. The under-
emphasis on deliberation in decision-making, and the over-reliance of the “groping along” 
approach should be of policy concern.  
Furthermore, the Chinese decision-making system in relation to wind energy was relatively 
open, but only during the early stages of the policy process. The system remained closed towards 
the final stages when the NDRC decided to choose the tendering policy for nation-wide 
implementation in 2006. Why the fixed-price model was not chosen despite general support 
from the Chinese wind experts and industries was not explained to the public or deliberated in 
an accountable manner (Mah & Hills, 2008). 
To sum up, policy learning did take place in China in relation to the pricing policies for wind 
energy. On the basis on Glasbergen’s (1996) differentiation of technical, conceptual and social 
forms of policy learning, China was able to progress from technical to conceptual forms of 
learning. However, the progression has been confronted by major barriers to progress further to 
social learning.  
On the basis of the analytical guide developed by Maarleveld and Dangbégnon (1999), the 
policy learning processes that was under way in China are summarized in Table 2. This table 
shows the ways policy learning for wind pricing policies involves a broader participation of 
stakeholders, what were learnt in the process, how and with what benefits. 
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Who? 1. The Centre: NDRC’s Department of Price, National Energy Administration, 
research institutes (in particular Energy Research Institute) 
2. Provinces: provincial Development and Reform Commissions 
3. Societal players: NGOs (including Greenpeace and Energy Foundation), 
Industrial Association (e.g. CREIA – give a “cover-up” for mid-rank reformist 
officials) 
 
Learnt 
what? 
1. Widened policy options 
2. Improved data 
3. New knowledge 
4. Unintended policy outcomes – and the underlying incentive structures 
 
How? 1. Trial by error: Experimentation that matched with local contextual 
opportunities 
2. Policy transfer from previous policy experience 
3. Creation of political significance by ways of provinces’ aggregation – a key 
force for policy convergence  
4. Institutional set-up and reinforcing policies (resulted from Renewable Energy 
Surcharge): data accumulation and information disclosure 
 
What 
benefits? 
1. Interests realigned for collective goals 
2. Policy coherence 
3. Policy legitimacy for radical policy change 
4. The strengthening of local implementation  
 
 
Table 2: How policy learning for the pricing policy for wind energy took place in China 
 
Conclusion: policy learning and environmental governance  
 
This paper has focused on various dimensions of policy learning in relation to the transition 
towards a more sustainable energy system in China. Using the example of pricing policies for 
wind energy in China, this paper has illustrated that despite a progression from technical to 
conceptual learning, further advancement to social learning – the highest-order of learning - was 
seriously constrained. The limitations of policy learning in relation to wind energy should be of 
concern because as we have demonstrated, the policy-making process for wind is complex and 
one that involves a great deal of unintended policy outcomes with highly dynamic incentive 
structures among policy stakeholders. Our observations appear to suggest that a more 
decentralized, deliberative policy-making system could improve the efficacy of wind energy 
policies in China. Our identification of the tensions in the central-local relations that have 
obstructed the policy learning process for wind energy suggest that to improve efficacy of wind 
energy policies China may have to examine its central-local relations. It appears that the central-
local relations may need to be reshaped so that China’s environmental governance system can 
better incorporate the emerging roles of localities and societal actors in improving wind energy 
policies. The central government appears to have over-centralised policy-making for wind energy, 
and this has resulted in standardizing local policies that has not only dampened local creativity in 
policy-making (in Shanghai and Guangdong), but also create unintended negative outcomes 
(such as the aggressive bidding behaviour of some SOEs, and the emergence of a spate of local 
“pseudo-tendered” projects in some provinces). 
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Figure 1: China’s bureaucratic structure for the policy-making of wind energy 
(Source: author; Data: website of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, from www.gov.cn, accessed on February 10, 2009)
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Code Interviewees Background Types of 
interview 
Date of 
interview 
BJ/01/2009 Shi Pengfei, Vice President, Chinese Renewable 
Energy Industries Association; Senior Engineer 
(Professor), China Hydropower Engineering 
Consulting Group Co.  
FI Oct, 2009 
BJ/02/2009 A Chinese wind energy expert who is affiliated to the 
National Development and Reform Commission 
FI Oct, 2009 
BJ/03/2009 A senior official, New Energy and Renewable Energy 
Department, National Energy Administration, 
National Development and Reform Commission 
FI Oct, 2009 
BJ/04/2009 Liu Shuang, Campaign, Greenpeace China FI Oct, 2009 
SH/1/2008 A senior executive of Shanghai Electric Power 
Company 
FI Jun , 2008 
SH/2/2008 An anonymous mid-rank official, Energy 
Development Department, Shanghai Municipal 
Development and Reform Commission 
FI Jun , 2008 
XJ/01/2008 Yu Wuming, former general manager of Xinjiang 
Wind Energy Company; the deputy director of 
NWTC; and a expert to Xinjiang government  
FI Oct, 2008 
 
List of Interviews 
 
*The interview formats included face-to-face interview (FI) and telephone interview (TI). 
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